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This paper offers a broad overview of the Hungarian development strategy over the past 
two decades. Combining historical and functional analysis, some major strengths and 
weaknesses are identified, with special emphasis on the country’s open-door policies 
and the role played by the European Union. The paper investigates why the impetus of 
institutional and financial integration was lost by about 2004 when policy drifting took 
over the role of strategies. Some ideas on how to remedy the situation are being offered. 
Paradoxically, the Hungarian success and failure both testify to the relevance of a neo-
institutionalist/political economy approach to sustainable development. It also examines 
the limitations of external anchoring by the EU as well as of the spontaneous bottom-up 
evolution of institutions when policy drifting continues.  
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In this paper we refrain from presenting a very long-term statistical analysis, for no 
other reason than the fact that Hungarian political and economic structures have 
undergone truly fundamental changes in the past 90 years, i.e., since the disintegration 
of the Habsburg Monarchy. Each event, but most recently the collapse of the Soviet 
empire in 1989/90, and the related economic and power structures have created new 
circumstances. In the following we attempt to summarize the post-1989 era, a period of 
two decades when basically everything has undergone a change in the process of 
Europeanization and globalization. 
In general, we also refrain from the detailed, and by its nature ephemeral, analysis of the 
ups and downs of specific years, as descriptions of such individual phases and their 
related analyses are available from a number of regional overviews. Instead, we adopt a 
developmental perspective, i.e., the long view, and therefore approach the Hungarian 
experience from the perspective of global political economy of reforms, focusing on 
facts that could be of relevance for other countries in managing their institutional and 
structural change. This is a unique, and in some way, a narrow perspective, but it 
follows the themes of the UNU-WIDER Development Conference on ‘Country Role 
Models for Development Success’. 
2  Is Hungary to be considered a success at all? 
Hungary is a country with a population of ten million people and a per capita GDP of 
€15,800.1 GDP grew 4.0 per cent per annum during the years 1996-2000; 4.3 per cent in 
2001-05, but dropped to 3.9 per cent in 2006. In 2007, growth decelerated partly 
because of the harsh fiscal adjustment measures included in the Convergence 
Programme of August 2006 adopted for the 2007-09 period,2 but did not come to a halt. 
In 2007, GDP grew by 1.3 per cent and, according to the consensus of analysts, a slow 
recovery to 1.6-2.0 and 2.5-3.0 per cent is expected for 2008-09. In short, almost 
similarly to the delayed and forced adjustment of the previous decade (Kornai 1997; 
Antal 1998), major fiscal adjustment has taken place without a recession, albeit the 
expansionary effects that many had hoped for on the basis of more theoretical literature, 
also failed to materialize. 
But this is not why Hungary can be considered a success story. During the period under 
review, growth tended to be significantly above the eurozone average: 2.7 per cent in 
1996-2000 and 1.4 per cent in 2001-05. Exports, a major component of sustainable 
external finance and thus lasting growth, expanded rapidly. Starting from a mere 
US$9 billion in 1989, exports had grown to US$15.7 billion by 1996, 30.5 billion by 
2001, expanding to 89.7 billion by 2007 and forecasted to reach US$101.6 billion by 
2008 (EIU 2008). With regard to foreign direct investment (FDI), Hungary has long 
been the champion in per capita terms as far as stocks are concerned, although the 
inflow peaked in 2005 at €6.8 billion; the figure for 2007 is around €5 billion, while the 
                                                 
1   Data source, unless otherwise indicated, is the ECB Statistics Pocket Book, August (ECB 2008). 
2   Various versions of the programme, most recently updated in December 2007 and approved by the 
Commission in January 2008, are available at the website of the ministry of finance: www.pm.gov.hu  2 
2008 projection is €5.6 billion.3 Still, foreign ownership accounts for approximately 40 
per cent of Hungarian assets and 80 per cent of its exports. Dynamic inward FDI has 
contributed to a major upgrading of Hungarian exports, with machinery and equipment 
accounting for 61.7 per cent (ibid.), or double the Spanish or Italian equivalent.  
In short, Hungary has been a success on a number of accounts. First, the country 
managed the transition from communism to democracy peacefully without any of the 
political turmoil witnessed in a number of countries in east and southeast Europe. 
Second, it managed its accession to the European Union in 2004 in a gradual and 
organized manner. Adoption of policies and institutions has been gradual, whereas 
opening up the domestic market was swift and irreversible. In so doing, Hungary was 
able to benefit from competition and structural adjustment and around 1996 inward 
investors were already factoring in the impacts of EU membership, including improved 
regulatory framework. Third, Europeanization speeded up and shaped institution 
building, and lent credibility to new institutions, such as the competition agency, the 
financial supervisory agency, or environmental agencies. Fourth, global processes had 
an impact in terms of IT revolution and deregulation. In terms of mobile use, Hungary 
ranks among the first in Europe. In terms of liberalization, e.g., airlines, insurance 
business and any other trades, the global processes have fostered change for the better 
and created sizable consumer surplus, as prices started to come down to single-digit 
levels during a number of years since 2001. All in all, Europeanization has been 
working both top-down—by setting up new organizations—and bottom-up through 
inter-firm contacts, massive movements of students as well as business executives and 
tourists. Stagnation of the formal institutional level of the EU has, by no means, slowed 
down the growing interaction at the microlevel. 
One of the toughest challenges is to define to what extent the above mentioned 
outcomes are the result of conscious policy that could be described with the term 
‘strategy’, as has become customary in the political economy of policy reforms. More 
probably than not, conscious and forward-looking decisions at some critical juncture 
were needed and these, indeed, were taken. But at other times, particularly since 
membership in the European Union in 2004, drifting and improvisation have prevailed 
over any conscious conduct of policy.  
The first major conscious decision was taken in 1989 when the communist government 
adopted a three-year liberalization plan and legislated for various forms of privatization 
(Szamuely 1990). The second major decision was taken by the newly elected 
conservative government, which, in fact, continued with liberalization. Moreover, 
ongoing legislative and political processes had culminated by 1992 in the adoption of a 
series of laws that made life for corporations much harsher. These four laws, concerning 
central banking, financial institutions, bankruptcies and corporate taxes, actually 
included most of what was by 1992 known as ‘second generation reforms’. This 
accounted for an institutional shock therapy (Bokros 1994) which contrasted these 
measures with radical liberalization, as practised in Poland and Russia at the time. 
                                                 
3   These figures are from the ministry of national economic development. Actual numbers tend to vary. 
For example, in terms of per capita stock over the 1993-2007 period, UNCTAD’s World Investment 
Report 2007 puts Hungary with €4,567 in third place, after Estonia (€5,660) and the Czech Republic 
(€5,306). Regional assessment by Ernst and Young, on the other hand, ranks Hungary as the 
frontrunner in a draw with the Czech Republic, both with €6,612 per capita for the decade, 1998-2008 
(reported in Világgazdaság, 26 June 2008). 3 
Finally in March 1995, fiscal adjustment and reform measures were introduced, with 
major expenditure cuts, surprise inflation and the introduction of a crawling devaluation 
of the currency.  
No further radical measures have been taken since then. However, it is beyond any 
doubt that until December 2002 when the enlargement decision of the EU was taken at 
the Copenhagen Council, a fair degree of consensus existed across the various fractions 
of the ruling elite on the need to comply with all or most of the Union’s entry 
requirements. These entry criteria covered political freedom, legal harmonization, 
institution building and introduction of policies that were not high on the domestic 
agenda, but which had been prioritized by the EU. The latter included issues on 
environmental protection, gender equity, cooperation with neighbouring states, or the 
improved transparency of legal and political decisionmaking processes. Thus there can 
perhaps be justification in considering the entire 1989-2004 period as a single 
continuum, as the commonalities obviously outpaced the dissimilarities. As a 
consequence, improved economic performance and solidification of democratic 
arrangements allow Hungary to be classified as a success story for the period under 
review.  
3  The changing interface of external and internal factors 
The strategy of global and European integration has evolved through trial and error 
during the socialist reform period. Hungary stands out among the communist countries 
of the period with respect to a few unique factors.  
3.1  Classical socialist system  
The classical socialist system as described by Kornai (1992) lasted for a mere four-year 
period (1949-53). Previously it had been commonly expected that with reunification 
with Austria (and eventually with Germany which actually happened in 1955 but which 
had been anticipated as early as 1947),4 Hungary would become ‘Finlandized’. Thus, it 
was believed that a non-communist government majority as well as the equally 
important dominant private sector would create a path to development comparable to 
that in Italy, Britain or France. In these countries, despite the financial sector being 
curtailed and state management extended, economic and political pluralism was 
sustained. Finlandization, in this perspective, would have implied security guarantees to 
the Soviet Union as well as a tolerance of Russian interference in various domestic 
affairs in exchange for economic liberties at large.  
The outbreak of the cold war thwarted these hopes, but the pluralist system was 
maintained until mid-1949. Already by June 1953, with a ‘new course’ initiated by 
Stalin’s heirs in Moscow, the reformist government under the leadership of Imre Nagy 
launched a series of changes, phasing out the command economy over a decade and a 
half.5  
                                                 
4   See Fülöp and Sipos (1998) for more details. 
5   For more details, see Berend (1988). 4 
3.2 Limited  pluralism 
The second oddity of the country was triggered by the fact that liberalization in 
Hungary, similar to Poland, went out of control and culminated in the revolution of 
1956. Despite the presence of occupation forces, the totalitarian system collapsed in 
twelve hours, and this signalled that it could be replicated any time. Therefore the new 
communist regime of János Kádár, installed in two weeks by the Soviets after crushing 
the revolution, made every effort to find a modus vivendi with the population, who had 
also learned that geopolitics limited freedom. 
Interaction between the leaders and the population created a continuously evolving set 
of interrelationships and change that developed into a model of limited pluralism in all 
walks of life.6 The economy was only one dimension of this gradual change, which, of 
course, fortified the regime as long as the geopolitical predetermination lasted. But 
simultaneously, obviously at odds with official creed, it undermined its legitimacy by 
allowing for a series of practical options, such as existence of the irregular economy 
from the late 1960s, particularly its large-scale forms after 1982.  
The limited but continuously expanding liberalization created the training ground for 
various forms of market activity. Moreover it helped the Weberian ‘commercial spirit’ 
to survive at the grassroots levels, i.e., millions working in small businesses, household 
plots, auxiliary and servicing activities outside the state controlled large-scale 
operations in trade, farming, industry, banking and even intellectual activity. The 
emergence of a ‘second society’, second publicity, second value set, second career path, 
coexisting with formal/official structures of communism, obviously eroded the old 
regime. 
3.3  Social learning in matters of the economy 
Most important from our perspective, this long trial-and-error period (when the concept 
of how capitalism could be restored without capitalists) promoted large-scale social 
learning in economic matters. As this paper is not the place to replicate these intriguing 
details,7 a summary should suffice at this point: social learning implied that much of 
what later became known as the Washington consensus, had been emerging through 
learning by doing, and through local dialog on the controversial reasons for the minimal 
success of the limited reforms. From a long-run perspective it is particularly relevant to 
note that a broad professional consensus emerged over the need to reorient trade from 
the east to the west, to conduct an open door policy vis-à-vis FDI, and to support private 
property as it emerged in an organic process rather than through legislative action. It 
became a deep and shared professional conviction that individuals assuming 
governmental responsibility observe a kind of professional minimalism, and that 
experimentation in general be avoided (Kádár 1994).  
This applied a fortiori to the wholesale transformation projects proposed by the offices 
or academic departments of various agencies. Using the parlance of the Wolfensohn 
presidency of the World Bank, the ‘domestic ownership of reforms has never been in 
                                                 
6   Cf., the collection of papers by Szabó and Majtényi (2008). 
7  More on these issues in Csaba (2003) which provides broad references and an historical account of the 
elements of the entire subject matter. 5 
doubt’. For this reason, a fair degree of continuity in terms of policy could indeed be 
observed and maintained, despite recurring pressures from democratic political 
processes that could have easily derailed the overall operation, especially during the 
push for immediate redistributory justice and other populist measures. This is a   
well-known phenomenon in any established multiparty democracy not applying rules-
based fiscal policy. 
3.4  Sustaining policies on structural reforms 
Continuing policies on structural reforms, mainly of the second, and in part of the third 
generation, had thus become politically feasible. As long as successive governments 
modified only the emphasis of the overall strategic direction, not the strategy itself, 
these measures had time to be internalized, applied and to produce results. For instance, 
it goes without saying that privatization, although vitally necessary, is by no means 
sufficient for improving efficiency, allocative and static alike. But if time and other 
scope conditions (competition, trustbusting, adjustment of administrative pricing and 
ensuring market entry for new participants) are secure, privatization can become 
effective. Present examples abound; from mobile phones to airline and insurance 
markets, not to mention the food industry or tourist services. However, this required 
time and patience, as the first results—as also with liberalization—were painful in terms 
of prices and redistribution.  
The above observation can also be validated through indirect reasoning. In some areas 
where such policies have not been sustained, outcomes have been less convincing. For 
instance, Hungary was among the first in terms of introducing a partially funded 
pension scheme in order to overcome the problems of an ageing society and a massive 
evasion of public dues (partly caused by the tax system supporting small businesses). 
However, the 1997 privatization scheme was gradually phased out and cancelled by 
successive governments over the years 2001-08 in efforts to court current pensioners 
who are among the most active participants in national and municipal electoral 
processes. Consequently, due to modifications to the system, much of the gain in terms 
of implicit debt reduction was undone, without resorting to an even partial 
nationalization of the pension funds (Orbán and Szapáry 2006). In turn, the fiscal 
burden of the pension system alone has increased to about 2.5 per cent of GDP per 
annum and is likely to grow despite timid measures introduced in 2007-08 to curtail 
early retirement and disability pensions.  
Similarly, the decrease of market capitalization and the increase of governmental 
intervention and spending during 2001-08 have clearly been at the root of the recent 
overall structural slowdown of economic growth. No new entries can be observed on the 
Budapest Stock Exchange, and all major privatization efforts (such as Budapest Airport 
in 2005 or Malév Hungarian Airlines in 2006) have evaded capital market deals in 
favour of policymakers hand-picking strategic investors. As a result, it is perhaps 
realistic to say that the local capital market has already lost its window of opportunity. 
Supporters of this line of thought (Pálosi-Németh 2008) note that large multinationals 
are already in the habit of funding themselves through global capital markets in New 
York or London, while small- and medium-sized businesses, due to their inherent 
features, tend not to be suitable for floating on the capital markets.  6 
4  On the role of professional and social consensus 
4.1  Social roots and broad-based approval 
The short summary above provides some (albeit partial) answers to rather intriguing 
questions in the search for the reasons for success. In short, no simple single-factor 
explanations can apply. 
It would be difficult to attribute success to policies and institutions only. This is, of 
course, the customary, textbook answer provided by analysts in the first instance. We 
have already alluded to what competing interpretations in political science have called 
‘embedded neoliberalism’ (Greskovits and Bohle 2007). This denotes to the social roots 
and broad approval of most of the major measures that have not only been 
contemplated, but also implemented. However, it is also true that over the past two 
decades of economic reform, a series of structural and policy measures were attempted 
or contemplated, but could not be implemented or sustained.                     
For instance, among the better-known samples, we could cite the following: 
–  introduction of local taxes (teho) in 1987; 
–  the attempts to introduce a value-based property tax in 1996 and 2007;  
–  experimentation with a wholesale introduction of tuition fees in 1995 and 2007; 
and 
–  centralization of the management of all public finance funds through the 
introduction of the treasury office in 1997.  
While there was a rather sound economic rationale behind each of the measures, they 
were all somewhat contrary to the implicit ‘social contract’. It is hard not to describe the 
2006-07 period as a series of attempts at reform despite the recognized characteristics of 
social contract and the ensuing resistance to these, especially in health care and 
reorganization of territorial administration. The landslide victory of the opposition in the 
referendum of 9 March 2008 and the ensuing split of the ruling coalition left the 
minority socialists without room for manoeuvre. One of the most palpable consequences 
of this was the ongoing lack of consensus with respect to the size and nature of 
reforming public dues. As noted by an insightful analysis by the Chair of the Round 
Table on Competition, a government convened expert body: the lack of professional 
consensus and adversarial political climate in 2005-08 mutually reinforced the 
debilitating outcome (Török 2008), i.e., that Hungary was the only new EU member 
where no serious tax and expenditure reform had been attempted during the years   
2000-08. This had a dampening effect on growth, particularly from 2004,8 however, the 
impact was much less on the country’s competitiveness due to the predominance of 
transnational corporations.  
                                                 
8   According to conservative estimates, fiscal expansion during 2004-06 must have contributed at least 
one percentage point to the growth rate of 4.3 per cent per annum. But such an expansion was 
obviously unsustainable in Hungary, as in any small open economy. 7 
4.2  Behaviour of foreign investors 
A second major component, usually overlooked by macro-scene analysts, is the 
behaviour of foreign investors. These are not always impressed by the changing moods 
of the rating agencies, the quality press, or even of the international institutions and 
academic fashions. Foreign investors have tended to qualify Hungary as a 
fundamentally good location, despite its well-known and publicized shortcomings in 
terms of policy incalculability, legal imprecision, or red tape and non-transparency. 
While the complaints on these accounts seem endless—and many are well founded—
major investors have generally considered Hungary and its environment in a broad 
sense as hospitable and profitable. The first had to do with the continuing insight, 
namely that the paucity of foreign savings and investment lowers current consumption, 
and that only a much slower pace of modernization is attainable. Thus, successive 
governments have maintained lavish investment incentives, and the low corporate tax 
rate (currently only 16 per cent) is also an incentive to realize profits locally for 
reinvestment rather than repatriation abroad through transfer pricing. Moreover, 
outward investment during the current decade started to grow, reaching the US$3 billion 
margin in 2007, highlighting the gradual maturing of the country as an investment 
locality.  
4.3  The structural upgrading of production and exports 
A related consequence of the former two factors has been the structural upgrading of 
production and exports. As more foreign and domestic investors increasingly adapt a 
long-term perspective, the more they invest in R+D, in their organizations, training, 
marketing and linking with international production and sales network across the board. 
The predominance of intermediary manufacturing, intra-industry and even intra-firm 
trade in Hungarian exports made it resistant to cyclical fluctuations and made possible 
the tenfold increase (from US$9 billion to 101 billion) already noted for the period 
1989-2008. This laid the foundation for a solid external position, based, according to 
central bank estimates, on an external financing requirement of no more than 2 to 3.5 
per cent of GDP for the period 2008-10.9 This is a major difference to the decades of 
the 1970s, 1980s and even the 1990s when external financial disequilibria was a 
recurring event among the major, but mostly unexpected, constraints that dominated all 
aspects of economic policymaking.  
4.4 Cumulative  processes 
Last but not least, the role of cumulative processes needs to be underlined. This means 
that instead of applying the usual analysis of comparative statics, longer-term 
developments may be understood better through multiple causalities. Interaction among 
various market players and regulators may turn out to be crucial, because such 
interactions can solidify, modify or even correct the outcomes and/or its unintended 
side-effects. 
Within this perspective, the strategic role of foreign investors, especially in the banking 
sector and in the process of Europeanization, which is perceived as a two-way social 
                                                 
9   For details and supportive quantitative analysis, cf. MNB (2008). 8 
learning process, might have been decisive. Ultimately, the decisive transnationalization 
—or according to its critics, extreme transnationalization—of financial intermediation 
might have anchored the rest of the process. Privatization of the banking sector already 
in the mid 1990s was a bold step, given the ongoing protectionist practices in much of 
continental Europe, France, Spain, Italy and Germany included. Furthermore, the 
practice of multinational corporations relying on parent-company financing or directly 
tapping the global capital markets has had two major ramifications. First, it helped to 
bridge the novel and largely inexperienced domestic banking and financial services 
industry and to iron out the shortcomings that could have easily become a major 
bottleneck to industrial restructuring and economic expansion in general. Second, it 
substantially constrained the ability of the government to pick winners along the more 
traditional lines, as in east Asia or France. Thus it enhanced the role of capital market 
financing and diminished the role of government-inspired allocational decisions. This 
helped to sustain a market-led line of restructuring, which is, by no means, the one-shot 
event in the contemporary world economy, but rather a process of continuous 
adjustment and renewal.  
5  Strategies, learning and unlearning 
As we have tried to sketch above, foreign actors—as the result of strategic options—
have had a major lasting influence in shaping decisions. However, it would be wrong to 
neglect the role of local policies and regulations, both in terms of their favourable and 
unfavourable implications.  
5.1  The role of local policies and regulations 
Domestic policies have fallen short of providing a truly sound macroeconomic policy 
environment during the entire period under scrutiny. Despite recurring attempts to 
streamline public finances, general government deficits, when adjusted for cyclical 
items and occasional creative accounting, tend to be around 6 per cent of GDP. In 
comparative terms (Bönker 2006), this seems to be a peculiarity of Hungary and should 
not be attributed to general trends in transition or to various one-off effects relating to 
EU accession. 
It would perhaps require a separate study to decipher how and why recurring budget 
deficits continue to emerge. In the 1990s most analysts would have attributed the 
recurrence to the ongoing dominance of state administration, extension of the welfare 
state and changing forms of redistribution stemming from social contract (Antal 2007; 
Muraközy 2008), but the 2000s obviously mark a new era. In this period, the anchor 
role of the EU has been lost, while ‘normal politics’—understood in most continental 
OECD countries in terms of myopic policy stances and refraining from major 
restructuring of the welfare state—have become the defining feature. This general trend 
is influenced by a level of extreme distrust among major political agents that translates 
into ever-shorter horizons and the tendency to inflate populist promises (Györffy 
2007b). Expectations of basic improvement, i.e., swift alignment with the eurozone, 
were widely shared by both investors and analysts alike, but the derailment, which in 
theory could have happened any time after 2004, has not materialized. However, in the 
longer run, crowding-out and the ensuing insufficient investment in all areas except 
manufacturing have led to a deceleration of growth.  9 
Similarly, according to ECB (2008: 37), Hungary’s inflation record has been dismal. 
Inflation reached a high of 15.1 per cent during 1996-2000, dropped to 5.8 per cent  
by 2001-05, to 4 per cent in 2006, but reverted to 7.9 per cent by 2007 and 7 per cent by 
2008. According to the central bank forecast, the 3 per cent inflation target is to be 
approximated only by 2010, and inflation is unlikely to come down to the inflation 
target before late 2010.8  
4.2 External  borrowing 
The role of external borrowing has changed politics. Whereas external finance in the 
communist period served primarily to bridge imbalances triggered by macroeconomic 
policies, the majority of financing since 1995 has gone to the private sector and 
investment. Hungarian growth remains export and investment led. For this reason, even 
the softening of policies during the current decade has not translated into serious 
external financing difficulties, as robust export growth and the continuous inflow of 
direct and portfolio investment have helped to overcome this problem. The overall 
picture, however, is modified if we consider that much of the portfolio investment in the 
2000s was used to cover fiscal deficits. Once the exchange rate10 stabilized and started 
to appreciate by an additional 8 per cent by mid-July 2008, the high nominal interest 
rate on forint claims translated into a real rate of interest for foreign investors. In other 
words, external financing came at a considerable cost (Erdös 2008). To put it 
differently, the room for manoeuvre could well have been utilized for launching third 
generation reforms because entry in the EU, particularly in the EMU, could have 
created an anchor for social forces and for expectations. This opportunity, however, 
seems to have been wasted.  
5.3  Joining the Euro-Atlantic structures  
Joining the Euro-Atlantic structures in 1999-2004 has had a stabilizing influence. 
Alignment with NATO at a time when it was at war with Yugoslavia on the borders of 
Hungary was a bold step, and put an end to a decade of uncertainty with regard to 
military strategy and neighbourhood policies. Membership in the EU also played a 
predominantly favourable role already during the accession process by anchoring 
expectations, shaping institutional change and lending credibility to the newly 
established, or even directly duplicated, regulatory agencies. However, it is equally 
obvious (Györffy 2007a) that EU membership and the prospect of a swift introduction 
of the single currency was loaded with moral hazard. While markets expected 
politicians to act in the best interest of the market, politicians took advantage of the 
advances in trust and credibility, misusing these for their own party policy games.  
Since then, the EU has been faced with its worst implementation crisis—large member 
countries flouting the Stability and Growth Pact and two founding members rejecting 
the Constitutional Treaty—consequently, existing procedures cannot ensure compliance 
in public finance. This is not an attempt to shift the blame on external factors instead of 
internal issues. However, it goes without saying that any country outside the perceived 
safe haven of the EU would have been severely punished by global capital markets for 
such continued misbehaviour, as was witnessed in Hungary in 2002-08.  
                                                 
10  Exchange stabilized around 250-260 forits per euro for the entire 2003-07 period. 10 
5.4  Open economy and open society 
Lastly, we have repeatedly referred to the favourable conditions created by an open 
economy and open society for sustaining and deep rooting modernization. In short, it is 
not just the question of substantial inflows of FDI and portfolio investment, nor is it 
only about formal membership in the EU. What really matters is what could be 
justifiably termed the ‘microfoundations’ of change. These include broad access to 
information, the spread and ever-cheaper use of internet facilities, large numbers of 
students being involved in exchange programmes like Erasmus and Socrates, faculty 
mobility programmes, as well as the spread of mass tourism, all of which constitute a 
form of on-the-spot training of how other societies work on a daily basis. Large-scale 
employment of foreigners in local firms and of Hungarians working in international 
firms and institutions also contributes to this experience. In short, ‘Europeanization’ and 
globalization (terms which we apply for convenience) have become factors of life that 
shape expectations (e.g., of earnings, discipline, quality of services), career paths as well 
as geographical mobility. The exchange of academics, businessmen and students creates 
an environment conducive to adaptive strategies on all layers of the economy and 
society.  
6  Causes and consequences of post-EU derailment 
Sustainability is a pet notion of modern economics and for good reason. Borrowed from 
biological sciences, it addresses a point often missed in earlier economics analyses fixed 
on maximizing attitudes, i.e., that maximum at a given point of time can lead to loss or 
even damages later. Furthermore, success should be measured in a continuum rather 
than through a comparison of discrete points in time. 
This consideration is obviously relevant to our assessment of the Hungarian 
development strategy. As could be forecasted years ago (Csaba 2007), EU membership 
created only the option—but not the certainty—of further reforms and institution 
building. As the EU increasingly stagnates in terms of institutional and policy renewal, 
immediate incentives fade for the political class to introduce the reforms that are needed 
for sustaining high growth rates and for achieving a real convergence to the EU-15 
average in terms of per capita GDP. In 2006, per capita GDP in Hungary was only 54 
per cent of the EU-15 average and only 63 per cent with regard to the average of the 
EU-27 (ECB 2008: 39).  
Even the rudimentary data cited at the beginning of this paper indicate that Hungary has 
entered a low-growth phase, because of repeatedly missed opportunities to consolidate 
public finances, and the ensuing impact of crowding-out of deficits. The level of public 
debt is a synthetic indicator11 of the mismatch between growth and financing: public 
debt has gone up from 52 to 66 per cent over the years 2001-07, and peaked at 67.5 per 
cent by the end of 2008 despite a major fiscal consolidation effort in 2006-08, while 
growth was close to 4 per cent, declining to 3.9, 1.3 and 2.0-2.2 per cent over the same 
period. Furthermore this also implies that the annual burden of amortizing public debt is 
about 4.5-5.0 per cent of GDP. In other words, the scope necessary to tackle structural 
                                                 
11  MNB (2008) and OECD (2008). 11 
reforms such as privatizing pensions, supporting infrastructural development, financing 
the streamlining of the overblown public administration,12 is already restricted by the 
need to pay for the costs of yesterday’s party, an issue known only too well in Europe.  
Other factors of growth also seem to be in poor shape. With real wages stagnant, 
personal savings are unlikely to grow while capital markets, as we have indicated, 
remain sluggish. According to a recent expertise report (OECD 2008), governmental 
savings are contingent on tough implementation of additional reforms, while the 
administration remains reserved on the probability of these, except for minor advances 
in severing early retirement. Finally, the corporate sector, a net saver during several 
years of the decade, may not be in such a position once the economy expands.  
Enhancing labour market participation to align with the EU’s Lisbon Agenda would 
certainly be a possibility. When people work instead of collecting various social 
transfers, they are also contributing to social security rather than merely drawing on its 
services. The Scandinavian example is quite convincing for ensuring higher 
participation rates and a subsequent steady, sustainable decline in public spending and 
deficits. By contrast, analyses by the ministry of finance (Ohnsorge-Szabó and 
Romhányi 2007: 265) have shown that measures triggered by purely electoral politics, 
such as reduced tax rates to low- and lower-middle income stratas or discretionary 
pension increases above the statutory levels, contributed to about half of the 2006 deficit 
of 9.2 per cent. Reversal of these measures, yet to materialize, is not sufficient for 
improvement. According to official 2008-10 projections by the ministry of social 
affairs, family and employment (reported in Magyar Hírlap 4 January 2008) that are 
aligned with the latest convergence programme, a mere 1.2 per cent increase is 
forecasted in labour market participation, bringing it slightly over 58 per cent, a figure 
that falls short of the Lisbon target by 12 per cent.  
This is a problem in its own right, but even more so for the public coffers, as substantial 
portions of the population are supported through transfers, rather than being converted 
into employees, either as self-employed or parttime workers. By contrast, as estimates 
of the independent research team CEMI (2006) have shown, a 10 per cent increase in 
the activity rate could by itself eliminate half of the deficit. Likewise, the suggestion to 
broaden the taxbase from the current 2.1 million fulltime taxpayers to 4 million (the 
total employed)13 would result in an improvement of an additional 3-4 percentage 
points at the macrolevel in terms of GDP. In sum, the combination of better 
enforcement and more employment could create the opportunity for further employment 
and lower tax burden. And, as of yet, we have not mentioned the option of cutting 
expenditures, which currently run at around 51 per cent of GDP, second only to 
                                                 
12   While labour market participation declined from 5.5 to 3.9 million over the 1989-2007 period, the 
number of individuals earning from public-sector payrolls has remained around one million, with 
another three million receiving pensions. According to conservative estimates, any streamlining would 
free at least 200,000-300,000 individuals. The rate of unemployment has risen by two percentage 
points to 7.5 per cent over the years 2001-07, and to 7.7 per cent by July 2008, exceeding the EU 
average of 6.7 per cent for the same period (ECB 2008: 43).  
13  In 2007, an individual earning more than 1.6 million forints was taxed according to the highest rate, 
38 per cent. In contrast, one million people, registered as small-scale farmers, are tax exempt for 
earnings up to six million forints per annum (this is the income level when no tax refunds and reclaims 
can be instituted). Further, 600,000 people earn, at least on paper, the statutory minimum wage, about 
double the estimate of the labour market agency. 12 
Sweden. In a way, what is needed is not a brand new strategy, but a correction of the 
derailments of 2004-08, i.e., in other words, going back to basic strategy could work 
miracles. The latter could include deregulating and simplifying the current non-
transparent system of public dues, improving the rule of law, enforcing existing laws of 
disclosure, and introducing rules-based fiscal arrangements in line with international 
experience (Kopits 2004).  
7  Lessons for global political economy of reforms 
From a global policy reform perspective, perhaps the most pertinent lesson from the 
experience of Hungary is the importance of sustained and conceptually anchored 
strategic interchange between governmental policy/institution building and spontaneous 
development/learning by doing. The Hungarian experience underscores the limitations 
of ‘pragmatic’ and ‘non-ideological’ approaches in managing longer-term processes, 
given that the number of tasks to be managed is infinite, and the pros and cons of each 
option are value loaded, and tend to be contradictory at any moment of time.  
At certain critical junctures of time, no orchestra, not even the best and smallest 
chamber orchestra, can play a complex piece by Bach, Mozart or Bartók, without the 
guidance of at least an informal chamber master. On the one hand, at certain points of 
time, public choices—for example, with regard to solidarity and incentives, fiscal 
sustainability, or adhering to the rules of international agreements—need to be 
institutionalized. On the other hand, it is at least as important for longer-term 
development as well as process management that the cooperation of millions of players, 
both domestic and foreign, be ensured with persuasion, transparency and internalization 
of these objectives and merits of the goals to be attained. This seems to have worked in 
the 1988-2004 period when stabilization, liberalization and EU accession were on the 
agenda. In contrast, failure in 2006-08 has largely been attributable to the misconceived 
attempt to introduce structural reforms through putsch (cf., Martin 2008; Szakolczai 
2008). 
It would be wrong to deny that under even normal times without any imminent crisis 
scenarios, it could be politically difficult and require more innovative solutions than 
customary to orchestrate a professional and social consensus around a few well-defined 
objectives. Adopting the single currency could perhaps be one such intermediary 
objective. Creating sustainable pensions is perhaps another. And providing acceptable 
livelihoods for regions outside the political centres might be a third objective, 
environmental sustainability the fourth.  
The quality of education at primary, secondary and university level needs to be 
mentioned. It is highly unlikely that without additional efforts and targeted development 
of skills, life-long learning can become nothing more than a slogan. As practical skills 
tend to become devalued in 5-10 years’ time in all walks of life, except perhaps the 
infamous hamburger job, action is needed even though the outcome will not be obvious 
for a decade or more. Traditional arrangements, such as universities and standardized 
secondary schools, have proven inadequate to combat the number-one problem of entire 
1980-2005 period in continental Europe. Thus Hungary’s current educational policy of 
copying existing arrangements from other countries with reference to EU standards 
might prove to be a dead alley.  13 
It is perhaps an inevitable byproduct of the FDI-led strategy that a substantial degree of 
dualism has emerged in economics, but even more so in social structures. The 
transnationalized sector is booming, its benefits multiple, and the trickle-down effect is 
palpable. However, in social terms, a large part of the small business sector, partly 
intertwined with the irregular economy, continues to stagnate under a backward system. 
Since the transnationalized sector, with its western-type wages and lifestyles, offers 
employment to only 15 per cent, social inequality manifests. Also, the three million 
pensioners out of a population of ten million tend to benefit little, if anything, from the 
dynamic components14 of these processes, even though members of this age-group are 
the ‘kingmakers’ of any election. Therefore social conservatism, well known from the 
continental welfare model, is likely to be sustained. 
Finally, it is perhaps important to acknowledge the need for continuous reform, which is 
likely to take the shape of reform waves. As one of the eldest insight in politics 
confirms, one electoral cycle is usually sufficient for a major reform agenda to be 
implemented, if managed by fervent reformers like Margaret Thatcher, Leszek 
Balcerowicz or Domingo Cavallo. Thus it may make sense to work out a strategy of 
reforms and to update these continually with feasibility studies, cost estimates and the 
introduction of sequencing propositions, as is done in large corporations. Given that the 
two unique events of the recent past—collapse of communism and membership in the 
EU—are history, normal politics, interest-group politics included, allows only for 
piecemeal progress. But if we take labour market reforms, for example, that were 
successfully managed by such diverse countries as Ireland and Denmark adopting 
different strategies, this might be a tall order, as it cuts across society. Likewise, pension 
reforms may require a decade or longer. Health care reforms may need more 
trial-and-error, while sustaining the calculability and access of citizens.  
This suggestion is justified by the need to set up and actively re-organize reform 
coalitions on a regular bias. This observation radicalizes the age-old insights of the 
political economy of policy reforms: without social, political, ideological and media 
support, structural reforms and institutional change are unlikely to endure long enough 
to produce palpable outcomes, even in the ‘single issue areas’. Furthermore it goes 
without saying that pro- and anti-reform interests, dispositions and convictions may 
vary among citizens of different generations, levels of education, or even places of 
residence, just to name a few of the more trivial components. Therefore, none of 
overarching broad coalitions, which means most of the democratic parties, qualify as 
agents of change par excellence. The more the traditional left-wing parties are being 
penetrated by business interests and the conservative parties with petty bourgeoisie, the 
less relevant the traditional assumptions about pro and anti-reform forces may prove to 
be. 
The experience of Hungary also highlights the limitations of external anchoring. As 
long as the stick-and-carrot influence of EU membership was present, it helped to form 
and sustain the needed political and professional consensus around all major strategic 
issues, regardless of the issues concerned (disinflation, respect for minority rights or 
longer-term environmental concerns). Once such leverage is gone, lack of internal 
                                                 
14 In terms of consumer benefit, better availability and quality of services, improved quality of regulation 
(e.g., of financial services) or lower prices induced by competition, pensioners may also be among the 
beneficiaries. 14 
commitment could lead to perverse outcomes. This means the misuse of soft external 
financing to fund non-reforms and old style populist policies,15 rather than financing the 
transition to sustainable pension and fiscal systems. The grandfatherly approach of 
international markets has allowed nonsensical policies to survive much longer than the 
theory of efficient financial markets would have assumed. In reality, soft external 
financing, although by no means the trigger of misconceived policies in 2001-08, 
certainly contributed to their coverup, just as much as was the case in 1972-78, 
specifically EU membership and the prospect of a fast adoption of the euro, which could 
indeed have been rational for several reasons. Still, the introduction of the euro has not 
materialized, but in reality it has added to a disorientation of the markets. Furthermore, 
EU’s current implementation crisis has prevented this being rectified through direct 
fiscal surveillance mechanisms. 
In summary, Hungary can provide samples of both well-timed reforms (i.e., advantages 
of early bird action, as witnessed during the years 1989-96) and poorly sequenced, 
haphazard measures (of the 2004-08 period). In particular, the 2006-08 period indicates 
how radical projects can be thwarted, inter alia, by poor preparation and design. But 
more importantly, the experience of this period underscores the need to separate and 
sequence different reforms according to the length of time needed and the technical 
difficulty and complexity of social implications. While it is a relatively straightforward 
procedure for a government to attempt to streamline taxation or fiscal affairs, it is an 
entirely different matter with the more elaborate, value-loaded issues, such as the 
socially and intellectually divisive areas of health care16 or environmental protection. 
Frontloading the health care and regional reforms, each with a time span in excess of 
15 years, must be seen as a major conceptual and sequencing error that immediately led 
to the reversal of most reforms planned by the socialist government, irrespective of their 
merits. The consensus from policy reform literature about the relevance of sequencing 
measures, or frontloading these with immediate returns and improvements, was 
confirmed once again. 
In short, the final lesson is the need for an integrated intellectual and analytical 
framework, a vision-cum-operational strategy that could be combined with tactical 
skills, persuasive power and coalition building—the vital ingredients of any reform 
policy for surviving under a democratic and pluralistic environment for one or two 
election cycles. Trust and social consensus are the most essential ingredients, albeit the 




                                                 
15  These policies are truly unique from a regional as well as a broader European perspective. More on 
this topic in Csaba (2009). 
16 For an enlightening account of why these failed, see Mihályi (2008). 
17 As one of the practitioners rightly noted recently with respect to the broad social consensus in 
rejecting a reform introduced by the socialist government: ‘the patient may well be unwilling to take 
even the best medicine from a physician who is to blame for the deterioration of his health’ (Bokros 
2008). In other words, achieving a consensus—any consensus—is not the issue; instead what is 
needed is an agreement on the proper principles and professionally sound platforms. 15 
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